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 How will smart meters be used? 
 Automatic and accurate billing, improve energy usage 
 Enhance energy distribution and efficiency 
 How can signal information processing/data analytics turn 
smart meter data into µXVHIXO¶ information? 
 Inform and enhance current energy information 
 Provide itemised billing down to individual appliances and activities 
 Provide advice on retrofit advice 
 How much and what kind of data do we need for effective 
data analytics? 
 Electricity, temperature, light, humidity, occupancy 
 Data collection 15mins, 1min, 30 sec, 1sec« 
 Can we draw better conclusions from individual/household 
detailed energy consumption?  
 
¾ How is data collected, where does it go? 
¾ How do we ensure privacy of data and detect tampering? 
Monitoring domestic energy usage 
within the smart grid 
How we implemented it at Strathclyde 
to gather smart meter readings 
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Analytics to provide intuitive feedback 
 We developed a scalable database that effectively manages 
incoming smart meter data, and provides an easy-to-query 
design 
 
 Designing and developing robust and low-complexity non-
intrusive load monitoring disaggregation algorithms for low 
sampling rate load data (< 1 Hz) 
 
 Appliance characterisation and modelling to provide 
appliance upgrade recommendations 
Data acquisition, management and 
repository 
 An automated platform for remote data collection and real-
time monitoring 
 Including remote and non-broadband customers 
 Keeping communications between home and server to a 
bare minimum, without compromising on data quality 
 
 Scalable repository of energy and environmental 
measurements  
 Data checking 
 Easy to add/remove sensors and houses 
 Query for correlations amongst sensor readings in the 
database 
 Query for correlations across houses (e.g., compare 
refrigerator consumption across selected houses) 
 Collecting/processing data in real time from a large 
number of houses (currently 40 houses) 
Power Disaggregation 
 Non-intrusive appliance load monitoring (NALM): Algorithmic 
VROXWLRQVWRGLVDJJUHJDWHRYHUDOOKRXVHKROG¶VSRZHU
readings to individual appliances 
 
 Find the consumption of individual appliances without using 
separate individual appliances power meters (IAMs) 
 
 Activity modelling allows for more relative feedback that 
people can understand and adjust habits 
 Improve: You used X amount of power yesterday on the kettle 
 ,I\RXGLGQ¶WRYHUILOOWKHNHWWOH\RXFRXOGVDYH 
 
 Very active research topic 
 Currently, only few commercial solutions that operate 
well, work only at extremely high sampling rates ~kHz 
Smart Meter readings ± UK Dept of 
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Communications 
Hub 
Wide area network (WAN) 
Block diagram from REFIT project team 
Wired Internet 
Smart grid communications architecture 
 Smart metering (SM) system located in houses comprises of 
a hug and sensor network 
 HAN based on 2.4GHz and 433MHz 
 
 From the houses, data transmitted to Communications 
Service Provider (CSP) via wireless NAN 
 Communication range 0.25miles  
 At least two CSPs in the range of each house 
 CSPs ± routers that forward packets possibly multi-hops 
 
 Data Communication Company (DCC) receives packets 
from CSP and performs processing 
Dept Energy and Climate Change Doc. Ref: 13d/006, DECC UK, Dec. 2013. 
Smart grid communications 
architecture 
 Lots of sensitive personal household data being gathered 
within the HAN and transmitted via WAN/NAN 
 
 Data contains billing information and energy consumption 
from which domestic routines can be inferred, inc. when the 
KRXVHKROGLVDZD\RQKROLGD\« 
Problem statement 
 Smart grid prone to cyber attacks and tampering due to 
sensitivity of information in the network 
 
 Key concern is against tampering, eavesdropping and traffic 
analysis 
 
 Types of attacks expected: 
 Entropy Attacks 
 Packet Erasures 
 Packet Modification / Corruption 
 Eavesdropping / Analysis 
Security in the smart grid 
 Pairing network coding (NC) with Paillier homomorphic 
encryption (PHE) 
 
 Due to its homomorphic additive and multiplicative 
properties, PHE simplifies computation of cipher texts and 
incorporation of linear NC 
 
 Intermediate nodes can still perform NC in the conventional 
manner without needing access to the systems private key 
Proposed Solution 
Random Linear Network Coding 
(RLNC) 
Benefits compared against traditional routing 
 Throughput 
 Efficiency 
 Scalability 
 Resilience to attacks and eavesdropping 
Issues 
 Larger transmission overhead 
 Linear dependency of coefficient vectors 
 k-th NC symbol/packet 
 mi ± i-th source message 
 gik random local encoded coefficient  
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Paillier Homomorphic Encryption (PHE)  
݌ǡ ݍDUHWZRNíELWSULPHV where k is the security parameter, are 
random and independent such that:  ݌ݍǡ ݌ െ  ? ݍ െ  ? ൌ  ? 
 ݊ ൌ ݌ݍ ߣ ൌ  ݌ െ  ? ݍ െ  ?  
 
Choose random integer ݃ where: ݃߳Ժ௡మכ  
 
Check modular multiplicative inverse: ߤ ൌ ܮ ݃ఒ݉݋݀݊ଶ ିଵ PRG݊ZKHUHܮ ߤ ൌ  ߤ െ  ?݊  
 
Public Key : ሺ݊ǡ ݃ሻ 
Private Key : ሺߣǡ ߤሻ 
PHE: Encryption and Decryption 
Homomorphic Properties 
Encryption: 
For a message ݉ א Ժ௡ 
Select random ݎ א  Ժ௡כ  
Calculate ciphertext using public 
key: 
   
2mod)( nrgcmE nm  
Decryption: 
Given received ciphertext ܿ ൏  ݊ଶ, 
recover the message using private key: 
22 mod)mod()( nncLcDm PO  
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Threat model 
We consider the threat posed by an attacker with the following 
characteristics: 
 
 The attacker can eavesdrop all network links 
 
 Has knowledge of scheme used 
 
 Is computationally bounded 
 
 Can inject or erase packets in the network 
Proposed scheme 
 Each house SM system performs NC on its HAN dataset  
 The local encoding vectors used are then encrypted using 
the public key 
 
 
 CSP performs conventional NC on all incoming encoded 
and encrypted packets from the houses 
Proposed scheme ± Combined 
RLNC and PHE encryption 
ܿ௜ ݁ ൌ ܧ௘௞ ݃௜ ݁ ǡ  ? ൑ ݅ ൑ ݄  ܿ ݁ ൌ ሾܿଵ ݁ ǡ ܿ௘ ݁ ǡ ڮ ǡ ܿ௛ ݁ ሿ 
݃ ݁ ൌ  ෍ ߚ௜ ݁ ݃ሺ݁ᇱ௜ሻ௛௜ୀଵ  ܧ௘௞ ݃ ݁ ൌ  ܧ௘௞ሺ෍ ߚ௜ ݁ ݃ሺ݁ᇱ௜ሻሻ௛௜ୀଵ  ൌ ෑ ܧ௘௞ሺߚ௜ ݁ ݃ ݁ᇱ௜ ሻ௛௜ୀଵ  ൌ ෑ ܧ௘௞ఉ೔ ௘௛௜ୀଵ ሺ݃ ݁௜ᇱ ሻ 
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 DCC/sink will first decrypt NC coefficients 
 Resulting global encoding vectors are used for RLNC 
decoding in the conventional way, e.g., using Gaussian 
elimination 
 Note that all houses have knowledge of the public key and 
only the DCC has knowledge of the private key for 
decryption 
 At the sink decryption can be carried out once a sufficient 
number of packets from the same generation has been 
received  
 

ݔଵڭݔ௛ ൌ ܩିଵ ݔ௖௦௣ሺ݁ଵሻڭݔ௖௦௣ሺ݁௛ሻ  
 
Proposed Scheme ± Decoding & 
Decryption at Sink 
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Analysis 
 Is efficient and does not incur a significantly high overhead 
 
 Features privacy against packet analysis 
 
 Encryption prevents against earliest decoding by packet 
analysis 
 
 Each message is of the same size helping prevent size 
correlation and buffering reduces effect of time order 
correlation attacks 
 
 Inefficient against Pollution and Entropy attacks 
Resilience to packet drops 
 CSPs dropping incoming packets 
 RLNC provides erasure protection, and 
additional PHE does not affect erasure 
protection of RLNC 
 Lemma1: If only one CSP is dropping all 
packets it receives, then all messages from any 
house can be recovered at the DCC 
 Attacker injects dummy packets 
 CSP can generate malicious content that is 
mixed with incoming packets 
 Lemma2: If only one CSP is injecting malicious 
content and mixing it with incoming packets, 
then all messages from any house can be 
recovered at the DCC 
Pollution and entropy attacks 
before decryption 
after decryption => 
Clear separation between 
corrupted and useful 
packets 
Adaptive threshold to separate  corrupted/injected packets 
from the original ones 
Computational Overhead 
 Communications Hub (SM) encoding:  
 PHE: O(N2) 
 Multiplications & modulus operations: O(N2logn) 
 
 CSP encoding: 
 Per packet O(N2 log n) 
 Total: O(N3 log n) 
 
  DCC decoding: 
 O(N2 log n) 
 With smart meter rollouts being deployed worldwide, it is 
critical to ensure secure transmission of sensitive personal 
data that is subject to eavesdropping and malicious attacks. 
 
 We propose a combined homomorphic encryption algorithm 
with network coding that provides security and privacy while 
maintaining RLNC allowing for a high chance of recovering 
packets at the sink. 
 
 Open work:  
 Implementation of lightweight verification scheme to 
prevent pollution attacks propagating throughout the 
network 
 Assessing robustness to a large scale attacks 
 Practical implementation  
Conclusions 
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